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CASE NOTE 
Federal Taxation-REORGANIZATIONS-DISTRIBUTION OF BOOT TO 
SHAREHOLDERS OF MERGED CORPORATION TAXABLE AS DIVIDEND, 
NOT CAPITAL GAIN-Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979). 
Mandell Shimberg, Jr., was the majority shareholder of 
LaMonte-Shimberg Corporation (LSC), a Florida corporation 
involved in home construction and sales. Shimberg, president 
and chief executive officer of LSC, owned 66.8% of the LSC 
stock.' MGIC Investment Corporation (MGIC) is a Delaware cor- 
poration many times the size of LSC, engaged primarily in the 
financial guaranty bu~iness .~  In 1970 MGIC and LSC executed an 
agreement to merge LSC into MGIC in a transaction qualifying 
for statutory merger treatment under I.R.C. § 368(a) (1) (A). 
In accordance with the merger agreement, Shimberg ex- 
changed all his LSC stock for cash in the amount of $417,449, plus 
21,461 shares of MGIC common stock outright, with an addi- 
tional 21,461 shares placed in escrow to be delivered in five years 
upon satisfactory completion of the contract condit ions.~him- 
berg and his wife jointly reported the cash distribution in connec- 
tion with the merger as long term capital gain. Upon audit the 
IRS determined the cash payment was a dividend and was thus 
taxable as ordinary income. Accordingly, Shimberg paid a tax 
deficiency in the amount of $125,883, with interest totaling 
$16,170. Denial of Shimberg's request for refund prompted the 
filing of this suit against the government. The district court held 
the transaction's net effect was a sale and the cash received was 
taxable as a capital gain.4 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
1. Shimberg's wife owned an additional 1.6% of the LSC stock for the benefit of their 
children, while the remainder of the stock was owned by 19 unrelated shareholders. 
2. As of Oct. 31, 1970, LSC's consolidated balance sheet showed retained earnings of 
$724,559, while on Dec. 31, 1970, MGIC reported $34,012,746 in retained earnings. 
3. LSC shareholders received pro rata a total of $625,000 in cash, 32,132 shares of 
MGIC common stock outright, and another 32,132 shares were placed in escrow for possi- 
ble future distribution to the LSC stockholders in accordance with a formula based upon 
a five-year average of the LSC earnings for the years 1970 through 1974. Prior to the 
satisfaction of the earnings requirement and the distribution of the escrowed shares, the 
LSC stockholders had no rights with respect to said shares. Brief for Appellee a t  5, 
Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3476 
(U.S. Jan. 16, 1979). 
4. Shimberg v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), reu'd, 577 F.2d 283 
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979). 
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reversed and held the cash payment had the effect of a dividend 
distribution5 within the meaning of section 356(a). 
Shareholders participating in corporate reorganizations de- 
fined in section 368(a)(1) are afforded favorable tax treatment 
under section 354. Section 354(a)(1) provides that no gain or loss 
will be recognized in reorganizations in which stock is exchanged 
solely for stock either (1) in the same corporation or (2) in another 
corporation that is a party to the reorganization. If, however, a 
shareholder receives money or other property (commonly called 
"boot") in an exchange to which section 354 would otherwise 
apply, section 356(a)(1) requires that any gain to the recipient be 
recognized to the extent of the money and the fair market value 
of any property received. 
Whether the boot is taxed as capital gain from the sale of a 
capital asset or as ordinary income resulting from dividends de- 
pends on whether the exchange has the "effect of the distribution 
of a dividend" within the meaning of section 356(a)(2). If the boot 
has the effect of a dividend distribution, each distributee must 
treat as a dividend the amount by which his gain recognized 
under section 356(a)(1) does not exceed his ratable share of the 
undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation. The re- 
mainder, if any, of the recognized gain will be taxed as capital 
gain from the exchange of pr0perty.l If the payment of boot is'not 
considered to have the effect of a dividend, all recognized gain 
will receive capital gain treatment.' 
A. Dividend Equivalency Principles of Section 302 
The phrase "has the effect of the distribution of a dividend" 
in section 356(a)(2) is held to be in pari materia with the phrase 
"essentially equivalent to a dividend" as used in section 3O2(a) (1) 
relating to distributions in stock  redemption^.^ Thus, courts have 
been willing to apply the principles of dividend equivalency de- 
veloped under section 302 to reorganizations involving boot under 
5. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 
3476 ( U S .  Jan. 16, 1979). 
6. I.R.C. 8 356(a)(2). 
7. I.R.C. !j 356(a)(1). 
8. Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir. 1956); Ross v. United 
States, 173 F. Supp. 793, 797 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959). Stock is consid- 
ered redeemed when a corporation acquires its own stock from a shareholder in exchange 
for property. 
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section 356.9 The Internal Revenue Service has also taken the 
position that "in appropriate cases the tests contained in that 
section [302] may serve as useful guidelines for purposes of 
applying section 356(a) (2). "lo 
Section 302 provides that a distribution made in a stock 
redemption will be treated as a capital gain from an exchange for 
stock if the redemption satisfies the requirements of section 
3O2(b) (l), 3OZ(b) (Z), or 3O2(b) (3) .I1 Otherwise the redemption is 
deemed a dividend, not an exchange, and is induded in the ordi- 
nary income of the shareholder to the extent provided in section 
301. 
A shareholder who is unable to qualify for capital gains under 
the objective standards of section 302(b)(2) or 302(b)(3) must 
seek relief under section 3O2(b) (1), which applies a subjective test 
of whether or not the redemption is essentially equivalent to a 
dividend. The section 3O2(b) (1) test for dividend equivalency was 
established by the Supreme Court in United States v .  DavisJ2 
The Court held that a distribution made in redemption of stock 
is not essentially equivalent to a dividend if the exchange results 
in a "meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate 
interest in the c~rporation."~~ Where, as determined from the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the exchange," the distribu- 
tion does amount to a meaningful reduction, the distribution is 
considered an exchange for property and is treated as a capital 
gain. 
In an effort to identify meaningful reductions in sharehold- 
ers' proportionate interests in a corporation, the courts and the 
Service have considered three factors: (1) the right to vote and 
thereby exercise control, (2) the right to participate in current 
earnings and accumulated surplus, and (3) the right to share in 
the net assets on liquidation.15 "A redemption which reduces 
9. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 605 (8th Cir. 1973); King Enterprises, Inc. 
v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 520-21 (Ct. C1. 1969); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 
793, 797 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959). 
10. Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121, 122. 
11. Congress created a statutory safe harbor for capital gain treatment in Q 302(b)(2)- 
(3). A stock redemption qualifies for capital gain treatment under the "substantially 
disproportionate" test of paragraph (2) if both (a) the shareholder's postredemption inter- 
est in the corporation is less than 80% of his preredemption interest and (b) the share- 
holder owns less than 50% of the corporation's voting power after the redemption. Section 
3O2(b) (3) allows capital gain treatment when the corporation redeems all the shareholder's 
stock in the corporation. 
12. 397 U.S. 301 (1970). 
13. Id. at  313. 
14. Treas. Reg. Q 1.302-2(b)(l955). 
15. Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111, 112 (citing Himmell v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 
815 (2d Cir. 1964)). 
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these rights may result in a meaningful reduction . . . within the 
meaning of Davis and, thus, qualify . . . as not essentially equiv- 
alent to a dividend under section 302(b)(l) of the Code."I6 The 
value of this analysis is questionable since these three shareholder 
rights are reduced in every redemption that does not involve a pro 
rata distribution. This analysis does not measure the amount by 
which stock ownership rights are reduced nor does it provide any 
standard for a minimum "meaningful reduction." Thus, even the 
reduction of all three of these rights does not guarantee capital 
gain status since the reduction may still not be meaningful. 
The term6'meaningful reduction" continues to be elusive 
because no per se rule defines the minimum percentage reduction 
of ownership required to assure that a redemption does not have 
the effect of a dividend." In one extreme situation a taxpayer was 
found to have experienced a meaningful reduction in interest 
even though his stock ownership only declined from 27% to 22.3%. 
The Service ruled that the taxpayer suffered a reduction in his 
right to vote, share earnings and profits, and share in net assets 
on liquidation. In addition, the taxpayer was no longer able to 
control the corporation in concert with another shareholder and, 
therefore, was entitled to capital gain treatment.lx It seems clear, 
however, that the Commissioner will not find a meaningful reduc- 
tion in interest if the shareholder owns more than 50% of the 
corporate voting power immediately after the transaction.Ig 
B. Section 302 Principles Applied to Section 356 
Even though the courts generally agree that the dividend 
equivalency principles of section 302 provide a useful guideline 
for the application of section 356,20 these principles are difficult 
to apply in the reorganization setting. To determine whether a 
stockholder's interest has been meaningfully reduced by a re- 
demption transaction under section 302, the stockholder's postre- 
demption ownership interest is compared with his preredemption 
interest in the same c~rpora t ion .~~  The meaningful reduction 
16. Id. 
17. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 610 (8th Cir. 1973). 
18. Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91. 
19. The Commissioner has impliedly taken this position on numerous occasions, but 
has never specifically declared it. See Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91; Rev. Rul. 75-502, 
1975-2 C.B. 111; Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112. 
20. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 605-07 (8th Cir. 1973); Rev. Rul. 74-516, 
1974-2 C.B.. 121; Cohen, Receipts Related to Corporate Equity: Return on Investment or 
Exchange?, 53 TAXES 824, 841 (1975). 
21. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970). 
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analysis is more complex, however, in a merger-reorganization 
because two or more corporations are involved. Specifically, in 
mergers involving boot distributions authorities differ as to 
whether the acquired corporation or the acquiring corporation is 
considered to redeem the stock and distribute the boot.22 The 
question is, therefore, whether the meaningful reduction analysis 
is to be applied to the shareholder's interest in the acquired cor- 
poration or in the acquiring corporation. 
In Wright u. United Statesz3 the Eighth circuit treated the 
boot distribution accompanying a reorganization as having been 
made by the acquiring corporation. The court in essence consid- 
ered all the stock of the acquired corporations to be transferred 
to the acquiring corporation, after which a portion of the ex- 
changed stock was redeemed for cash." The meaningful reduction 
test was applied in Wright by comparing the shareholder's inter- 
est in the acquiring corporation immediately before and after the 
distribution of boot.25 In other words, the Wright court compared 
what would have been the shareholder's stock interest in the ac- 
quiring corporation if the merger had been only a stock-for-stock 
exchange, with the shareholder's actual interest in the acquiring 
corporation following the distribution of boot. 
In Revenue Ruling 75-8326 the IRS contend* that in reorgani- 
zations governed by section 356 the acquired corporation must be 
viewed as having made the redemption and distribution. The 
Service insists that section 302(b)(l) is to be applied to section 
356 by hypothesizing a redemption by the acquired corporation 
immediately prior to the reorganization. The IRS therefore ap- 
plies the meaningful reduction test by comparing the share- 
holder's interest in the acquired corporation before and after the 
redemption. 
The conflict between the viewpoints of the Eighth Circuit 
and the IRS is crucial, particularly if, as in Shimberg, the re- 
demption involves a pro rata distribution of boot. Under the IRS 
approach, every distribution made substantially in proportion to 
the shareholders' stock ownership in the acquired corporation is 
denied capital gain treatment because there is no meaningful 
reduction in each shareholder's proportionate interest? The 
-- - pp 
22. compare Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112 with Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 
600 (8th Cir. 1973). 
23. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973). 
24. Id. at 607. 
25. Id. 
26. 1975-1 C.B. 112. 
27. "The hallmarks of a dividend, then, are pro rata distribution of earnings and 
profits and no change in basic shareholder relationships." Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 
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Wright approach does not preclude capital gain treatment per se 
under these circumstances because the meaningful reduction is 
applied in the acquiring corporation context. Since the distribu- 
tion is made only to those who were shareholders of the acquired 
corporation, all others owning stock in the acquiring corporation 
prior to the merger do not participate in the boot distribution. 
Therefore, the distribution is not pro rata and is not necessarily 
considered a dividend. 
In Shimberg the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re- 
jected the district court finding that the distribution did not have 
the effect of a dividend distribution under section 356(a) (2) .2n But 
in so ruling the court did not adopt in its entirety the IRS ap- 
proach of Revenue Ruling 75-83 nor did it follow the Wright ap- 
proach. The circuit court concluded the district court erred when 
it applied the meaningful reduction test of section 302 to the 
section 356 distribution in Shirnl~erg.~~ It observed that Shim- 
berg's control declined from 66% stock ownership in LSC to less 
than 1% ownership in MGIC. Speaking for the court, Judge 
Thornberry stated that because the control of small corporation 
shareholders will always decline substantially when their corpo- 
ration is swallowed by a large unrelated one, application of the 
meaningful reduction test in that situation would render section 
356(a)(2) meaningless. Capital gains would be allowed in every 
case where the small corporation shareholder's control is diluted 
by merger with a large corporation. Therefore, according to the 
court, Shimberg was not an appropriate case for application of 
section 302  principle^.^^ 
The court distinguished Wright on three grounds: (1) two 
corporations of similar size merged into a new corporation in 
Wright while Shimberg involved a merger of two different corpo- 
rations of different sizes, (2) the merging corporations in Wright 
were commonly owned as opposed to no common ownership in 
Shim berg, and (3) Wright consisted of a single boot distribution 
to one shareholder versus a pro rata distribution to numerous 
shareholders in Shim berg. 31 
F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1964) (emphasis in original). Given the IRS point of view, a pro 
rata distribution will always be treated as a dividend. 
28. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d at 290. 
29. Id. at 288. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 287. 
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In place of the meaningful reduction test of section 302(b)(l), 
the circuit court analyzed the facts and circumstances surround- 
ing the cash distribution to determine whether it had the effect 
of a dividend. The court reasoned that because a dividend is "a 
pro rata distribution of profits from a continuing corporation . . . 
and a corporate reorganization is a 'continuance of the proprie- 
tary interests in the continuing enterprise under modified corpo- 
rate form,"' a pro rata distribution of boot to a corporation partic- 
ipating in a merger has the effect of a dividend dis t r ibut i~n.~~ If 
$625,000 cash were distributed to the shareholders prior to, or in 
the absence of, a corporate reorganization it would have been 
taxed as a dividend. Likewise, the court concluded, this distribu- 
tion should be treated as a dividend." 
The Shimberg court denied its decision contravened the step 
transaction doctrine?' It asserted that if the doctrine were ap- 
plied to defeat the approach taken in Shimberg "it would be 
impossible to determine whether the 'boot' distribution had the 
effect of the distribution of a dividend."35 The court further 
argued that the boot distribution in Shimberg had not been 
treated as a separate step? 
The Fifth Circuit's reluctance to apply the meaningful re- 
duction test in Shim berg can best be explained by concluding the 
court misunderstood the test as applied in Wright. Having con- 
sidered Shimberg's decline in stock ownership from 66% in LSC 
to less than 1% in MGIC, the court concluded the meaningful 
reduction test was inappropriate where a small corporation 
merges with a large corporation. The shareholders of the small 
corporation invariably suffer a meaningful reduction in interest 
under the meaningful reduction test as applied in this set of cir- 
32. Id. a t  288 (citing Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 648 (1st Cir. 1949)). 
33. Id. at 289. 
34. Tax analysis normally requires that a business transaction be separated into 
segments for examination. However, unfairness may result if the transaction is divided 
into too many parts. The step transaction doctrine has been developed to avoid injustice 
by preventing an integrated transaction from being broken into steps or, alternatively, by 
requiring that separate steps be considered together for tax.purposes. Helvering v. Ala- 
bama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 US.  465 
(1935); Kanawha Gas & Utils. Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954). "[Alll 
parts of a multi-step exchange or reorganization are grouped together to determine the 
appropriate tax treatment for the entire transaction, if the several steps are an essential 
and integral part of the overall plan." Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d at 289. 
35. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d at 290. 
36. Id. 
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cum stance^.^' Unfortunately, this conclusion is the product of a 
misinterpretation of the meaningful reduction test applied in 
Wright. BX 
A. Wright Approach Applied to Shimberg 
The Wright approach to the meaningful reduction test pre- 
sumes an "all stock" merger followed by a postclosing redemption 
of the number of shares equivalent to the boot actually distrib- 
uted. Therefore, under the Wright approach, Shimberg's interest 
in MGIC-had he only received MGIC stock in exchange for his 
LSC stock-would be compared with his actual interest in MGIC 
after the redemption to determine whether his interest had been 
meaningfully reduced. Shimberg would have owned 0.458% of the 
MGIC stock outstanding if he had received all stock and no 
boot? In actuality, following the boot payment Shimberg was left 
37. Acceptance of the Wright method as understood by the Fifth Circuit would estab- 
lish a rule having the opposite effect of the now defunct "automatic dividend" rule. In 
Shimberg the Fifth Circuit denied that its decision revived the automatic dividend rule 
adhered to by the IRS for many years. Based on loose language in the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945), the automatic divi- 
dend rule meant that whenever both stock and boot were received in a distribution, all 
boot was taxed as dividend to the extent of the stockholder's share in the corporation's 
earnings and profits. The rule was finally abandoned in 1974 when the standards of 
dividend equivalence of $302(b) were adopted by the IRS as useful guidelines for applying 
4 356. Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121; Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118. The circuit 
court believed a contrary decision in Shim berg would have the opposite effect of allowing 
capital gains in every merger between corporations of disproportionate size. 577 F.2d a t  
290. 
38. Shimberg himself led the Fifth Circuit astray by promulgating this misinterpre- 
tation. The attorpeys for Shimberg placed great emphasis on language in Wright indicat- 
ing the Eighth Circuit looked at  the whole of the transaction to determine dividend 
equivalence under $ 302(b)(l) and Davis. Brief for Appellee a t  21,22, Shimberg v. United 
States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979). 
Consequently, they argued in Shimberg that the taxpayer's 66% stock interest in LSC 
should be compared with his less than 1% interest in MGIC. Id. at 12. However, the better 
reading of Wright indicates that, although the court also considered the transaction as a 
realistic whole, it placed greater weight on analyzing the change in the taxpayer's interest 
in the acquiring corporation. Specifically, the Wright court considered the decline in 
ownership interest in the acquiring corporation to be from 85% to 61.7%. The Eighth 
Circuit concluded that this 23.3% reduction in interest was meaningful. Wright v. United 
States, 482 F.2d at 609-10. 
39. The merger agreement called for a total exchange of MGIC voting common stock 
valued at  $3,750,000 and cash amounting to $625,000 for all of the outstanding shares of 
LSC. The market value of a share of MGIC stock at  the time of the merger was $58.35. 
Brief for Appellee a t  24 n.9, Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979). At the time of the merger, Shimberg 
received, in exchange for his LSC stock, 21,461 shares of MGIC stock and $417,449 in cash. 
Shimberg had no interest a t  the time of the merger in an additional 21,461 shares placed 
in escrow, such interest being entirely a future interest dependent on the postmerger 
earnings of the LSC business. Assuming that Shimberg's cash consideration had been 
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with only 0.344% of the stock outstanding." Properly applied, the 
Wright method shows the boot distribution to have reduced 
Shimberg's interest from 0.458% to 0.344% instead of from 66% 
to 1% as erroneously derived by the court in Shimberg. Had the 
Fifth Circuit correctly applied the section 302 principles adopted 
in Wright, the court could have found that the boot distribution 
in Shimberg did cause a meaningful reduction; therefore it did 
not have the effect of a dividend and was a capital gain." 
received in stock, he would have obtained an additional 7,154 shares of MGIC stock 
($417,449 i $58.35) for a total of 28,615 (21,461 plus 7,154) shares. 
Prior to the merger, 6,204,448 shares of MGIC stock were issued and outstanding. An 
additional 32,132 shares were issued to the LSC stockholders at  the time of the merger, 
for a total of 6,236,580 shares issued and outstanding. Had the $625,000 cash consideration 
been exchanged as stock in the merger, 10,711 more shares would have been issued to the 
LSC stockholders ($625,000 i $58.35) for a total of 6,247,291 MGIC shares issued and 
outstanding. 
The calculations demonstrating Shimberg's percentage of ownership follow. 
Shimberg's Percentage Ownership After the Merger: 
MGIC shares owned by Shimberg 
(21,461) plus 7,154 shares 
28,615 - equivalent to cash 
- = 0.458% 
6,247,291 Issued and outstanding MGIC 
stock (6,236, 580) plus 10,711 
shares equivalent to cash 
See id. 
40. Shimbergk Percentage Ownership After the Merger and After a Redemption of 
His Stock Equivalent to Cash Received in theMerger: 
MGIC shares owned by Shimberg 
(28,615) less 7,154 shares 
21,461 - equivalent to cash 
6,236,580 - Issued and outstanding MGIC = 0.3441% 
stock (6,247,291) less 10,711 
shares equivalent to cash 
See id. 
41. The decline of Shimberg's stock ownership from 0.458% to 0.344% represents a 
25% reduction and would most likely qualify Shimberg for capital gain treatment under 
the 8 302(b)(l) meaningful reduction test. See also Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92 
(shareholder allowed capital gain treatment when his percentage of stock ownership was 
reduced from 0.00011 18% to 0.0001081%). 
Alternatively, Shimberg could be found to qualify for .capital gains through the 5 
302(b)(2) substantially disproportionate redemption test. Although no court has ever ap- 
plied 4 302(b)(2) to 8 356, it appears the Eighth Circuit would have applied it had the 
taxpayer in Wright qualified. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d a t  608. If 5 302(b)(2) is 
considered to be a specific example of 5 302(b)(l), then paragraph (2) can be deemed 
applicable to 8 356 since paragraph (1) is pari materia with 5 356. Hawkinson v. Commis- 
sioner, 235 F.2d 747, 754 (2d Cir. 1956); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793, 797 (Ct. 
Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1954). 
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B. IRS Approach Applied to Shimberg 
Although the Fifth Circuit rejected the Wright approach, it 
did not directly adopt the method advanced by the IRS in Reve- 
nue Ruling 75-83.42 Under the IRS approach the section 302(b)(l) 
meaningful reduction test would be applied to compare Shim- 
berg's interest in the acquired corporation (LSC) prior to the 
merger with his interest in LSC as though LSC paid the boot in 
redemption of the stock before effecting the merger with MGIC. 
Since the boot distribution was pro rata to all the shareholders 
in LSC, Shimberg's proportionate interest in LSC remained con- 
stant at 66% even though the number of shares he owned was 
reduced. The IRS would assert that Shimberg's interest was not 
meaningfully reduced within the meaning of Davis; therefore, he 
pp - - 
Assuming an "all stock" merger and a postclosing redemption of the number of 
Shimberg's shares equivalent to the cash he actually received, all as contemplated by 
Wright, Shimberg suffered a substantially disproportionate redemption within the mean- 
ing of Q 302(b)(2). A redemption is subtantially disproportionate if (a) the shareholder's 
postredemption interest in the corporation is less than 80% of his preredemption interest 
and (b) the shareholder owns less than 50% of the corporation's voting power after the 
redemption. Calculations can demonstrate the satisfaction of Q 302(b)(2): 
(a) Shim berg's Percentage Ownership After the Merger: 
MGIC shares owned by Shimberg 
(21,461) plus 7,154 shares 
28,615 - equivalent to cash 
- = 0.458% 
6,247;291 Issued and outstanding MGIC 
stock (6,236,580) plus 10,711 
shares equivalent to cash 
(b) Shimberg's Perce'ntage Ownership After the Merger and After a Redemption 
of His Stock Equivalent to Cash: 
MGIC shares owned by Shimberg 
(28,615) less 7,154 shares 
21,461 - equivalent to cash 
= 0.3441% 6,236,580 - Issued and outstanding MGIC 
Stock (6,247,291) less 10,711 
shares equivalent to cash 
(c) of Shimberg's Ownership Position Prior to the Redemption (0.458%): 
0.80 x 0.00458 = 0.366% 
(d) Shimberg's subsequent ownership position (0.3441%) is less than 0.366% 
(80% of his prior ownership position) and, furthermore, is less than 50% of 
MGIC's total voting power. 
(e) Thus, Q 302(b)(2) is satisfied. 
See Brief for Appellee a t  24 n.9, Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979). 
42. 1975-1 C.B. 112. 
CASE NOTE 
should be taxed as receiving ordinary income because the distri- 
bution was essentially equivalent to a dividend. 
C. Shimberg Test for Dividend Equivalency 
Instead of applying the meaningful reduction test in 
Shimberg, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the effect of the boot to 
determine whether the distribution should be deemed to have the 
effect of a dividend.43 As described above, the court concluded 
that under the Shimberg facts section 356(a)(2) requires a deter- 
mination whether the distribution would have been taxed as a 
dividend if made prior to, or in the absence of, a reorganization. 
The Fifth Circuit has, unwittingly perhaps, adopted the bottom 
line of Revenue Ruling 75-83. Determinaion of the tax conse- 
quences of a distribution without regard to the reorganization is 
the same as analyzing a boot distribution in which the acquired 
corporation is presumed to have redeemed the stock and distrib- 
uted the boot. Although the Fifth Circuit appears to apply a new 
test, the circuit court has actually employed the meaningful re- 
duction test as interpreted by the IRS. 
The test for dividend equivalency applied by Shimberg and 
Revenue Ruling 75-83 distorts reality. The test ignores the fact 
the reorganization is part of the transaction and absent the reor- 
ganization the distribution would in all likelihood not have been 
made. Furthermore, the fact the acquiring corporation generally 
provides the cash for boot distributions requires that the role of 
the acquiring corporation be considered in the tax analysis." 
Even if the acquired corporation possessed the necessary funds to 
redeem the stock, it would probably retain the funds as working 
capital were it not for the merger. 
Although the Fifth Circuit expressly denied it, the court's 
disregard of the reorganization in its analysis of whether the dis- 
tribution would have been taxed as a dividend violates the step 
transaction doctrine. That doctrine precludes the court from 
viewing Shimberg as a constructive redemption by the acquired 
company (LSC) followed by an entirely separate reorganization. 
By separating the hypothetical redemption from the reorganiza- 
tion, the court ignores both the acquiring corporation and the 
transaction's overall r e ~ u l t . ~ T h e  court hinted its rejection of the 
43. 577 F.2d at 288-89. 
44. As of the time of the merger, LSC had cash of approximately $147,000. Brief for 
Appellee at 31 n.14, Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
47 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979). 
45. The Wright method at least considers the continuity of shareholder interest from 
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step transaction argument stems from the close relationship the 
argument bears to the premise that the meaningful reduction test 
is appropriate in Shim berg. 46 Having rejected the meaningful re- 
duction test without understanding it, the court uses that erro- 
neously based determination to deny application of step transac- 
tion principles. 
The unfairness of the Shim berg decision can be illustrated by 
hypothesizing a merger in which no boot is paid, but later (suffi- 
ciently distant to avoid the effects of the step transaction doc- 
trine) the acquiring corporation meaningfully reduces the propor- 
tionate interests of the shareholders of the acquired corporation 
by redeeming a portion of their stock. The Shimberg taxpayer 
whose receipt of boot is a part of the reorganization is found to 
have realized ordinary income, while the taxpayer in the delayed 
redemption escapes with capital gain. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In deciding Shimberg, the Fifth Circuit has created a split 
in the circuits. Unfortunately the court thought the meaningful 
reduction test as applied in Wright would have created an 
"automatic capital gain" rule for mergers of small corporations 
into large corporations. As a result the real merits of that test, as 
applied to the facts of the instant case, were never considered. 
Consequently the Shimberg court generally rejected the Wright 
approach to determining dividend equivalency and unwittingly 
gave support to the IRS position in Revenue Ruling 75-83. 
The Shimberg decision lends credence to the IRS' position 
that any pro rata distribution of boot incident to a reorganization 
automatically has the effect of the distribution of a dividendmd7 
Because the Shimberg decision does not follow Wright, nor con- 
vincingly distinguish or refute it, the result in Shimberg is wholly 
unsatisfactory. Instead of shedding greater light on the conflicts 
surrounding the interrelationship of sections 302 and 356, the 
Fifth Circuit has only succeeded in adding to the confusion. 
Bruce E. Babcock 
the acquired corporation to the acquiring corporation by treating the latter entity as 
making the distribution. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973). 
46. 577 F.2d at 290. 
47. This results in a partial revival of the "automatic dividend" rule referred to in 
note 37 supra. 
